Abstract

The term "Industrial Control System" (ICS) encompasses various control configurations, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and programmable logic controllers (PLC). ICSs historically operated in isolation from the internet. However, recent technological development has driven a convergence between ICSs and internet-based environments, such as cloud computing, breaking the isolation. This shift exposes ICSs to the same attack vectors prevalent in cyberattacks. Despite this exposure, ICS devices are inherently less secure against advanced attack scenarios. A compromise to an ICS can result in substantial physical damage and pose threats to human lives.

The first half of this talk reviews fundamental topics about control-theoretic approaches for secure industrial control systems. Our exploration begins with traditional model-based anomaly detection and its adaptation to the security context. Subsequently, we discuss zero-dynamics attack that conceals its existence by exploiting the zero dynamics of the system's dynamics. In the latter half, the speaker provides recent results of his works. In particular, we consider a model-based defense techniques that perform not only detection but also counteractions based on Bayesian inference and mathematically analyze its fundamental properties using game theory. In addition, as another topic, recent findings about vulnerabilities of data-driven control are also exhibited.

Bio

Hampei Sasahara received the Ph.D. degree in engineering from Tokyo Institute of Technology in 2019. He is currently an Assistant Professor with Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan. From 2019 to 2021, he was a Postdoctoral Scholar with KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. His main interests include secure control system design and control of large-scale systems.